

THE EDWARD DAVIS COMPANY



Prepared By:

The Edward Davis Company

32 Atlantic Ave 5th Floor Boston MA 02110 eddavisllc.com

mail@eddavisllc.com

Prepared For:

National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ)

NAWJ CONFERENCE BOSTON October 23 -25, 2025

萝


ABOUT ME

Edward F. Davis is the President and CEO of The Edward Davis Company, a strategy and security services firm that advises government agencies, courts, and Fortune 500 companies on crisis response, risk management, and security planning. He served as Boston Police Commissioner from 2006 to 2013, leading the nationally recognized response to the Marathon bombing.

With more than 35 years in law enforcement, Commissioner Davis has extensive experience in judicial and courthouse security, high-profile trial protection, and strategies to sa feguard judges and court staff from threats and intimidation. He has testified before Congress and the Senate on terrorism and public safety, and has served as an expert witness in cases that directly impacted judicial outcomes.

Internationally, he has a dvised on policing and justice issues in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

He holds a master's degree from Anna Maria College, honorary doctorates from Northeastern, Suffolk, and UMass Lowell, and was a Fellow at Harvard's Institute of Politics.





Paul McLaughlin

In September 1995, Boston prosecutor Paul McLaughlin was shot and killed by gang leader Jeffrey Bly, who had McLaughlin tracked before the murder. Bly was set to be prosecuted by McLaughlin on carjacking charges the next day.

Details of the case:

- Paul McLaughlin: An assistant attorney general, McLaughlin was assigned to the Suffolk County District Attorney's office to prosecute gang-related cases.
- Jeffrey Bly: A leader of the Theodore Street Posse gang in Boston's Mattapan neighborhood, Bly feared going to prison for the carjacking and decided to kill Mc Laughlin to stop the trial.
- Motive: Bly, the leader of a gang in the city's Mattapan neighborhood, had developed a vendetta against McLaughlin after the prosecutor had previously tried Bly twice on other charges. Fearing a long prison sentence, Bly plotted the murder to prevent the carjacking case from moving forward.
- Tracking: Bly instructed a fellow gang member to follow Mc Laughlin from his courthouse office to his car at a commuter rail station in West Roxbury, recording his movements.
- The murder: Bly waited for Mc Laughlin at the train station. When Mc Laughlin got into his car, Bly shot him once in the head and fled.
- Aftermath: Bly was convicted of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced to life in prison without parole.



Photo of Mr. Paul McLaughlin Source: The Boston Globe



Edward T. Bigham III

On October 2, 1980, Middlesex County prosecutor Assistant District Attorney Bigham, 28, was shot and killed a long Memorial Drive in Cambridge after his car broke down. Three Boston men were later charged in the attack.

Details of the case:

- Assistant District Attorney Bigham: A Middlesex prosecutor since 1979, he began in the District Court system and had been promoted to the Superior Courts only a month before the shooting.
- The attack: Around 140 a.m., Bigham's Volkswagen developed mechanical problems and was parked roadside when a large white carpulled up behind him. Three men approached. Bigham was shot in the chest.
- Aftermath at the scene: Bigham staggered from the vehicle before collapsing a few steps away. An MIT security guard administered emergency aid, but he was pronounced dead at Cambridge Hospitalat 2:03 a.m.
- Suspects: Henry McLendon, Aldin Carter, and Arnold Evans, all Boston residents in their early 20s, were charged with murder, two counts of armed assault with intent to rob, and assault with a dangerous weapon.

Prosecutor who saw colleague killed urges board to deny parole



DANIEL ANDERL JUDICIAL SECURITY & PRIVACY ACT

BACKGROUND & ORIGIN

- Named in memory of Daniel Anderl, the 20-yearold son of U.S. District Judge Esther Salas, tragically murdered in a home attack in July 2020.
- The assailant impersonated a delivery driver and had obtained Judge Salas's personal info online.

KEY PRO VISIONS

- Bans data brokers from posting, selling, sharing information
- Protects judges' & families' Personally Identifiable
 Information
- Judges: request removal → 72-hour takedown
 Exceptions: voluntary disclosures, news, gov't
 records
- Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. may seek removal/injunctions; grants for redaction

IMPLEMENTATION

- Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Threat Management Branch offers Information removal services & threat monitoring services.
- Home Intrusion Detection System program reimburses home security enhancements. Up to \$2,500 for equipment plus increased monitoring support (\$800 annually).

Feature	Federal (Daniel Anderl Act 2022)	New Jersey (Daniel's Law 2020)
Who is protected?	Federaljudges & their families	State judges, prosecutors, law enforcement & families
What info is protected?	Addresses, phones, vehicle info, SSNs, schools, property	Prim a rily addresses and phone numbers
Scope	Na tio n w id e	State of New Jersey only
Obligations for Public Entities	Must redact PII from publicly a vailable records/websites upon request	Must remove/redact PII from online public records within specific timelines
Criminal Penalties	Civil pena lties; potential injunctions and fines for noncompliance	Crim in a l pen a lties (d isorderly persons offense); fines and potential ja il tim e
Online Platform Liability	Platforms may be required to remove info or face fines	Platforms must comply or face civil/crim in alpenalties under NJ law

≣⊐

PERSONAL SECURITY

Home Security

- La yered defenses: a la rm s, ca mera s, reinforced doors, trim med landscaping
- Use P.O. Box for mail; scrub home address from public records
- Establish and regularly practice family safety protocols (safe words, emergency plans, lockdown drills)

Digital & Daily Life Protection

- La yered defenses: a la rms, cameras, reinforced doors, trimmed landscaping
- Use P.O. Box for mail; scrub home address from public records
- Family Preparedness: Coordinate with family to coordinate safety protocols
- Community familiarity increases digitalrisk: neighbors or local acquaintances may share personal info on line.

Public & Community Presence

- Anticipate that litigants may see you in the community afterward.
- Deflect case-related conversations politely
- Avoid apparel, license plates, or vanity markers that identify you as a judge.
- Vary where you shop, dine, and attend services to avoid predictable patterns.

In the Courtroom & Commuting

- Park in well-lit, populated areas; avoid signs marking reserved "Judge" parking.
- Never preside without a security officer present.
- Keep proceedings orderly—remove disruptive individuals immediately to prevent spillover intimidation outside court.
- For virtual hearings from home, a lways use an official virtual background to hide personal surroundings.

Special Emphasis for Female Judges

- Recognize that gendered harassment may target your role as both judge and woman —often spilling into family or community life.
- Family-centered protections (schoolsa fety, digitalmonitoring, a wareness training).
- Work closely with local police to extend security beyond the courthouse —including home patrols, faster response times, and ongoing communication.

==

THREAT MANAGEMENT

Evaluate credibility and capability:

How to Assess Threats

Determine whether the threat is specific (who/what/when/where), feasible (does the person have the ability to act), and persistent or escalating in intensity.
 Distinguish between impulsive outbursts and credible, planned actions.

Analyze context and risk level:

• Consider whether the threat violates law or protective orders, appears in public forums (e.g., online), or targets family members, all of which elevate risk. Use a structured threat assessment scale (low/moderate/high).

Leverage documentation to reveal patterns:

• Record every incident (date, time, subject, evidence, witnesses, response) in a centralized, secure log. Repeated vague threats or unusual contacts can signal escalation when viewed collectively.

Threat Response



- Always document: every threat including date/time, subject details and nature of the incident, maintain originals of every concerning contact.
- Adhere to organizational or institutional protocols designed for handling threats.
- Involve authorities promptly, especially when there is a credible or immediate risk.

Muted Threat Response >

Respond quietly when threats are:

- Vague, impulsive, or non-specific.
- Isolated outbursts with no evidence of capability.
- Risk of prosecution would escalate the threat actor's behavior.
- Insufficient evidence for charges

When do Threats Lose Relevance?

- Threats lose relevance only with continued oversight, not silence.
- Reduced frequency, intensity, and proximity could indicate that the threat environment is becoming less
 → severe.
 - Judges may he sitate to report repeated or low-level threats or harassment.
 - Institutional encouragement and a clear reporting culture are essential to ensure proper evaluation and ongoing protection over time.



EDC COURT ASSESSMENTS

WHAT WE LEARNED

WHAT WE What Prompted Security Assessments in the Court System?

- Increase in emotionally charged family/domestic cases
- Rising harassment, intimidation, and doxxing of judges
- Courthouse facilities uneven, security systems untested
- Growing concern about workplace violence and active shooter threats

What We Learned (System -Wide)

- Post orders are inconsistent across courthouses
- Duress/panic switches are often untested or unknown
- Judges report threats, follow them beyond courtrooms
- Awareness and culture are as critical as physical security
- Fobs are being used instead of keys; fobs can be easily duplicated

What We Learned (Courtroom)

- Zoning opposing parties reduces flash points
- Pre-court '5 -minute huddle improves readiness
- Bailiff placement critical in family/domestic dockets
- Judges' parking spaces are identified by their names

What We Learned (Travel/Commute)

- Parking lots and transitions are consistent risks
- Vary routes/times when possible
- · Escorts are effective but underutilized
- Safe-haven routes (police/fire stations) are not widely known

WHATS CHANGING

What's Changing (Judges' Personal Safety)

- Issue safety packets with home/travel checklists
- Train families on household and social media safety
- Routine late -day escorts for high -risk sessions
- Follow threats across a judge's career, not just cases

What's Changing (System Level)

- Standardized post orders across courthouses
- Quarterly duress alarm tests with tracked response times
- Risk-rating of dockets, especially family/domestic cases
- Unified threat intake and triage process
- Replace fobs with something more secure
- Change names from parking spots to "reserved"

What's Changing (Daily Habits)

- Reverse-in parking, well-lit/staffed areas
- Delayed posting on social media, don't post location
- Lighting, locks, and cameras at home
- Household plan for unexpected visitors

What Can Be Done Now

"QUICK WINS" (0-90 DAYS)

- Issue judge safety packets
- Repair chokepoints, re -key doors (if needed)
- Adopt pre -court huddles and docket risk -ratings
- Offer quick home security consults



THANK YOU

CONTACT US:



Call

+888-550-3120



Address

32 Atlantic Ave Boston MA 02110



Mail

mail@eddavisllc.com



Web Adress

www.eddavisllc.com